Celebrating the Reformation as transformation to dignity by Katts, Donald J.
Stellenbosch  eological Journal 2017, Vol 3, No 2, 145–162
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2017.v3n2.a06
Online ISSN 2413-9467 | Print ISSN 2413-9459
2017 © Pieter de Waal Neethling Trust
start page:
 Celebrating the Reformation as 
transformation to dignity
Katts, Donald J
Stellenbosch University
djkatts@mweb.co.za
Abstract
South Africa is on an urgent journey of transformation toward a life of dignity for 
all. Dignity is at the heart of the South African Constitution of 1996. Some essential 
building-blocks of dignity are reconciling justice, responsible freedom, equality as 
equality of worth and equality as aequitas, equity and equilibrium. This paper will 
discuss how the theology of Reformers like Luther and Calvin informs our thinking 
about these central features of dignity. Calvin informs our thinking about justice and 
equality, and Luther informs our thinking about freedom.
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1. Introduction
The Latin word Reformatio literally means ‘restoration or renewal.’ When 
Luther started his onslaught on the Roman Catholic way of belief and 
religious practices, he and those who followed, actually set out to restore 
and renew not only the Church’s religious thought and understanding, but 
Luther as the pioneer, as well as his followers, also wanted to renew their 
understanding of political power.
Thus, one can already detect here that religion and politics cannot be 
separated; they cannot be understood to be two railway lines that co-
exist next to each other, but have nothing to do with each other and never 
interact with each other. Reformation, therefore brought to light that 
politics needs religion so as to be just, fair, dignified and equal, fostering 
equality, equilibrium and aequity. Religion, on the other hand, helps 
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politics to be free and so fosters freedom and helps ensure citizens who 
enjoy their freedom responsibly.
Likewise religion needs politics for the simple fact that as politics evolves, 
develops and grows, it challenges religious precepts, concepts, dogma and 
beliefs. Politics is necessary for religion to adapt, renew and, perhaps, be 
transformed so as to stay relevant and to continue being a key role player 
in building not only citizens who treasure and acknowledged their own 
dignity, and respected the dignity of others, but helping to establish a 
humane society, where all is free, equal and treated justly.
2. The theology of Reformers thicken our understanding of 
notions like dignity, justice, equality and freedom
South Africa is a multi-cultural, multi-religious, ethnically diverse and 
economically unequal society. Prior to 1994, theology was one of the major 
role players in bringing Apartheid to its end. Today it still plays a vital role in 
building a humane society in which the dignity of all is acknowledged and 
respected, so fostering human rights, equality and responsible freedom. It 
was especially the theological understanding and insight of the Reformers 
that gave impetus to putting Apartheid in its reformed perspective and 
thus emphasising concepts like dignity, justice, equality and freedom.
2.1 Dignity – Theology says it is Trinitarian1
The theology of the Reformers enhances our understanding of dignity in 
that it argues that every person has an inalienable dignity. It teaches that all 
humans were and are created in the image of God (Calvin2).
We can therefore say that our dignity has Trinitarian sources. Our dignity 
is based in the person and work of the creating Father, the electing Father, 
1 For the notion of Trinitarian dignity, the insights of John Webster and Nico Koopman 
are richly drawn upon. (Webster, J. The Dignity of Creatures, in P Middleton (ed.), 
The Love of God and Humanity Dignity. Essays in Honour of George M. Newlands 
(London: T&T Clark, 2007), pp. 19–33. Koopman, N. Human dignity in the context of 
globalization, in Boesak, A and Hansen, L (eds), Global crises, global challenge, global 
faith. An ongoing response to the Accra Confession. (Stellenbosch: Sun Press), pp. 231–
242.
2 See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge 
(Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2008).
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the providing Father, the caring Father. Our dignity resides in the fact that 
God takes human beings so seriously that God became human in Jesus 
Christ, the kenotic Christ, the incarnated Christ, the crucified Christ, the 
resurrected Christ, the ascended Christ, the reigning Christ, the returning 
Christ. Our dignity is based in the person and work of the Holy Spirit, 
the indwelling Spirit, the working Spirit, the actualizing, operationalizing, 
implementing, materializing, embodying, shape-giving, fulfilling Spirit, 
the transforming Spirit, the renewing Spirit, the perfecting Spirit.
2.1.1 Our dignity resides in the loving act of God
Our dignity resides in the loving act of God, the creator who summons us 
into being. Our dignity is a created dignity. Our vulnerability, as expressed 
in our creaturely needs, is not in conflict with our created dignity. Our 
needs reflect our dependence upon God who summoned us into being and 
who gave life to us, and who fulfils and consummates a life of full glory for 
us.
Human dignity as responsible selfhood, identity across time and creaturely 
continuity cannot be had remoto Deo, i.e. in separation from the creator’s 
summons. Dignity does not reside in autonomy and independence, but 
in this dependence upon God the creator. The dignity, worth, honour 
and glory of creatures rest in our calling by God to live in fellowship and 
communion with Him. Webster states:
God crowns creatures with glory and honour, marking them out as 
the recipients of his approval, and setting them apart for fellowship 
with himself. Creation is exaltation; creatures have dignity as they 
are dignified by God (Webster 2007:24).
From this divine foundation of our dignity emanates the theological 
imperative to acknowledge and respect dignity. According to Webster:
Only God the creator can crown with glory and honour; creatures 
are not competent to ascribe dignity to themselves or to other 
creatures. Human judgements about dignity can only be repetitions 
of the divine judgement, acts in which honour is recognised as 
an indicative and imperative which rests on the divine decision 
(Webster 2007:24).
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Human dignity as created dignity means that we receive our dignity from 
the creator. Our dignity is inalienable because it is given by the creator. 
It is inalienable because it does not come from humans, but it comes 
from the creator. It is inalienable because it is not dependent upon the 
recognition of dignity by the frail and unreliable hearts, minds and actions 
of humans, but it is dependent upon the living God. Creaturely dignity 
as inalienable dignity implies that our dignity does not reside in our own 
merit, capabilities and performance. Inalienable, creaturely dignity is 
received dignity. It is dignity in the presence of, in communion with, and 
in dependence upon God the creator.
Our calling with regard to acknowledging and affirming, actualising and 
fulfilling dignity is to witness in word and deed to the dignifying decisions 
and actions of God the creator. But even our unfaithfulness to this calling 
does not mean that people can be alienated from their dignity. We may 
deny, disregard, disrespect, betray, abuse and violate this dignity, but we 
cannot rob or alienate people from their God-given, creaturely dignity.
Webster refers to the fact that the creator calls us to enact our being in 
fellowship with Him. The Christian tradition teaches that this human 
being is created in the image of God. And as his image we share in God’s 
freedom, authority, creativity, rationality, responsibility and in his desire 
and capability to live life in communion.
Through the lens of Webster these features are defined and substantialised 
in terms of the recognition of the vulnerability of humans who are called 
to live in dependence upon and in communion with God. Therefore our 
freedom is in harmony with God’s freedom, which is always a freedom 
for the other, specifically for the suffering other. Our authority is always 
authority received from the creator and therefore redemptive, serving 
and liberative authority. Our creativity, work and labours are to create for 
the sake of communion and joy. Our rationality reflects the rationality 
and logic of God, and therefore transcends the modernistic criteria of 
rationality, namely that which makes logical sense and that which can 
be empirically verified. Our desire for communion resonates with God’s 
desire for and realisation of a communion of care and solidarity, mutuality 
and reciprocity.
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2.1.2 Our dignity is also christologically based
Our dignity is also christologically based. Webster argues that a theology of 
dignity should be developed within the context of Saint Augustine’s appeal 
that dignity discourse should be part of hamartiological and soteriological 
discourse. As human beings we cannot destroy our dignity, but we can 
alienate ourselves from the relationship with God our creator. Human 
dignity can only flourish in the context of a relationship with God where 
we thankfully accept the gift of dignity and our calling to live a dignifying 
life. We trample on our dignity through two sinful ways; through our 
rush for carnal fulfilment and dishonourable passion, as well as through 
our conviction that we ourselves, and not God, are responsible for the 
establishment and protection of our dignity. This carnality and skewed 
form of responsibility are ways of refusing to accept the gift of dignity. This 
refusal to accept the divine gift, according to Webster, causes alienation 
and misery:
The sinful state which eventuates may be characterised by alienation 
(the objective breach of relations between creator and creatures in 
which creatures come to discover that they have placed themselves at 
a mortal distance from the source of life and blessing) and by misery 
(the subjective degradation which comes from the futile attempt to 
have life on conditions other than those established by the creator’s 
love) (Webster 2007:26).
Where we isolate ourselves from God, and where we follow our own logic 
for our lives instead of God’s logic, there we do not enjoy the blessing of 
dignified living that God has in store for us.
Through the Person and the extensive and comprehensive work of Jesus 
Christ God affirms our dignity. According to Webster Christ affirms and 
protects our dignity “by the full scope of this divine mission: its origin 
in the eternal procession of the Son; the assumption of flesh; the state of 
humiliation; the exaltation of Easter; the glorious rule of the Son as the 
ascended and enthroned reconciler who presents himself in the Spirit’s 
power (Webster 2007:29).”
Through the work of Christ God provides a way for sinners to live in 
communion with Him again, to accept his gift of dignity and the vocation 
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to live and witness to a God-given life of dignity. In this regard Webster 
cites Calvin’s comment on Psalm 8:
… the heavenly Father has again bestowed the fullness of all gifts 
upon his Son, that all of us should draw out of this well-spring: 
whatsoever God bestows upon us by him, the same of right belongs 
in the first degree to him; yea, rather, he is the lively image of God, 
according to which we must be amended, upon which all other 
things depend.’ And so: ‘His excellence and heavenly dignity are 
extended unto us also, for whose sakes he is enriched with them 
(Webster 2007:29; in Calvin, A Commentary on the Psalms, Vol 1 
[London: Clarke, 1965], pp. 93–94).
The gift of creaturely dignity that humans due to sin do not fully accept and 
enjoy, is embodied by Jesus Christ. Christ is the perfect human which fully 
accepts and enjoys the gift of creaturely dignity. Thereby He confirms this 
dignity and enables us as sinful humans to accept and enjoy the gift. Only 
through Christological dignity do we accept and enjoy creaturely dignity. 
The dignity and glory of Christ is pro nobis. It is for us, it is our dignity.
2.1.3 Our dignity is also based in the person and work of the Holy Spirit
Our dignity is also based in the person and work of the Holy Spirit. The 
Spirit is the Spirit of God through whom God perfects and actualises the 
dignity of human beings in correspondence to God’s plans and purposes, 
calling and summons. The Spirit is the Spirit of Christ through whom the 
glorified Son directs creaturely realities to their completion. In this journey 
the Spirit generates, sustains and purifies obedience and active consent on 
the part of creatures.
Webster states:
The Spirit moves creatures, and in moving gives them their proper 
spontaneity and integrity, that is, their dignity as the active children 
of God (Webster 2007:30).
Dignity is actualised in the Christian communion, in the Trinitarian 
communion, in the church. In communion with the triune God our dignity 
is created, confirmed and actualised. In communion with fellow creatures 
it becomes clear that this dignity is not only metaphysical, but that it is 
also orientational and moral. Dignity as a gift from God also takes on 
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social shape and form amongst God’s creatures. Our moral imperative is to 
acknowledge, protect and testify to this Trinitarian and ecclesial dignity. 
We are called upon to resist the denial and betrayal of dignity.
This Trinitarian dignity is bestowed upon all human beings, both male 
and female, and for that matter, also upon people with all other sexual 
orientations.
In pluralistic public discourses theology put these thicker or more 
comprehensive understandings of the roots of our inalienable dignity on 
the table. Theology does this in humble, hospitable and, as far as possible, 
in an intellectually accessible manner.
3. Justice
Just as dignity is portrayed as the dignity forthcoming from God, so we 
can argue that justice is forthcoming from God. Justice is the justice of 
God. Four decades ago B Wentsel3 discussed justice as God’s justice. He 
argues that God’s justice is constituted by a threefold virtue, namely justice 
as norming and guiding justice for all walks of life, justice as retributive 
justice, and justice as salvific justice.
All these dimensions of justice are based in the notion of the work of 
justification of the triune God. Justification entails that the triune God 
justifies and sanctifies sinners. God brings forgiveness and salvation, 
justification and sanctification. He transforms people into justified and 
sanctified ones who receive the vocation to seek justice in the world. 
Justification and sanctification are interdependent. We cannot talk about 
one without the other. Moltmann,4 in line with Luther and Calvin, describes 
justification as mortificatio sui, the dying to the self, and sanctification as 
the vivificatio Spiritu, life in the Spirit.
3 B. Wentsel, Hij voor ons, wij voor Hem. Over gerechtigheid, verzoening en gericht 
(Kampen: Kok, 1973), pp. 50–57.
4 J. Moltmann, The Spirit of life: A universal affirmation (London: SCM, 1992), pp.163–
165.
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Justification paves the way for seeking justice in the world. Paul Lehman,5 
who argued against the unhappy divorce between soteriology and ethics, 
views justification as what God does to set things right between humans and 
God. Justice, as the human quest to set things right amongst humans, is our 
faithful response to these actions of God. “When justice is understood as 
the setting right of what is not right in man’s (sic.) relationship to man (sic), 
both private and public, then, the struggle for justice becomes the concrete 
expression, in behaviour, of man’s (sic.) response to what God has done 
and is doing to set things right between man (sic.) and Himself” (Lehman: 
1967). The faith by which man is justified becomes what Luther called a 
‘busy, living, active thing’ by who men learn in the struggle for justice what 
it means concretely to forgive and to be forgiven. Luther’s notion of living 
and effective faith parallels his understanding of justification as dynamic 
and effective, as the divine bringing forth and making of humans who are 
simultaneously sinful, on the one hand, and forgiven and just, on the other 
hand. These justified ones are continuously in search of personal and social 
justice through a process of self-judgement and repentance.
In a very helpful article Mark Seifrid discusses Melanchton’s and Luther’s 
views on justification6. He is concerned that Melanchton interprets 
the important notion of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness in a 
reductionist way. He reasons that Melanchton views justification – in an 
arid, juridical manner – as a means of quieting the conscience, and as a 
means of inward renewal. He runs the risk of viewing justification as a 
human possession, a human virtue. He does not view justification as 
a dynamic, sanative and continuous action of God, as Luther does. For 
Luther, according to Seifrid,7 the imputation of righteousness is not merely 
the initial act by which God imparts salvation, but rather the continuous 
way in which God governs and purifies the life of the justified. It is a forensic 
and declaratory act, but it is also more. It is also an effective word of God, 
5 P. L. Lehmann, “Forgiveness”, in J Macquarrie (ed.), The Dictionary of Christian Ethics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 131.
6 M. A. Seifrid, “Luther, Melanchton and Paul on the question of imputation”, in M 
Husbands and DJ Treier (eds.), Justification. What’s at stake in the current debates? 
(Downer’s Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press/ Leicester, England: Apollos, 2004), 
pp.148–150.
7 M. A. Seifrid, Luther, Melanchton and Paul, p. 145.
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which paves the way for faith, daily repentance and self-judgment by which 
God ‘makes out of unhappy and proud gods, true human beings, that 
is, wretches and sinners8.’ We might conclude that for Luther the divine 
declaration of justification is, therefore, also a continuous divine making 
into a just person of the sinner9.
Based on the idea that through justification God transforms human beings 
into righteous and just persons, Stanley Hauerwas argues that the task of 
Christians is not only to formulate theories of justice, but in the first place 
and fundamentally to be just persons.
… for Christians, justice is first and foremost a claim about the 
kind of people we ought to be. You cannot have, contrary to liberal 
assumptions, a just social system, without people being just. The 
attempts to create such systems end in creating greater state power 
in the name of doing justice. Christians do not need such accounts 
of justice to know that the ill need care and the hungry need food. 
By learning to share their lives in the church, Christians have 
learned that justice often demands no more than the most common 
acts of care.10
The author of this article understand Hauerwas’s plea to be one that 
expresses the confidence that just people, people who do not forget the 
most basic calling to care, are well placed to participate in the public quests 
for theories and systems, policies and practices of justice.
8 Luther, as quoted by MA Seifrid, Luther, Melanchton and Paul, p. 151.
9 Seifrid’s summary of Luther’s dynamic understanding of justification, and of its 
implications for a life of personal and social justice, amidst sin and injustices, might be 
quoted at length:
Luther’s dynamic conception of justification much more effectively conveys the 
way in which God’s mercy is granted only in judgment. The justification of the sinner 
takes place only in and through the justification of God in the event of the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. “Justification” is no mere transaction to be applied to my 
account. God’s “yes” is given only in and with his “no,” a “no” and “yes” which are mine 
only in so far as faith echoes them in my heart. Both in the foolishness of pride and sin 
and in the despair of misery, suffering and failure, this Gospel of the justifying work of 
God in Christ both conquers and carries us sinners.
10 S. Hauerwas, “Should Christians talk so much about justice?”, in B&R Reviews May/
June 1986, p. 6.
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This discussion hopefully sheds some light on the relationship between 
God’s justice and human justice, between justification and justice.
Where human justice is based in God’s justice, a richer understanding of 
justice is developed. We might identify two dimensions of the compassionate 
justice of article three of the Belhar Confession. It can be argued that the 
notion of compassionate justice implies that justice has a forensic or legal 
dimension and that it also has features like mercy, sacrifice, righteousness, 
reconciliation and restoration.
The Old Testament uses justice mainly in a twofold way, i.e. as forensic justice 
(mishpat), and as compassionate justice (tsedaqah). The New Testament 
dikaiosune, carries both meanings. Bruce Birch11 describes mishpat as a 
term with a basic forensic character. It deals with judicial activities at every 
level. It is an ethical concept that deals with rights due to every individual 
in the community and with the upholding of those rights. Especially God’s 
justice refers to the upholding of the rights of the vulnerable, and with the 
advocacy of their needs (Deut.10:18; Ps.10:18; Jer.5:28). Where the rights of 
the vulnerable are violated, God’s justice can be translated as judgement, 
the activity of God to hold accountable those who deny, manipulate and 
exploit the rights of others. Various theories of justice that developed in 
the post Enlightenment era also strive to employ justice, amongst others 
through the notion of human rights, as a pathway towards homecoming for 
millions, i.e. enjoying the good of the land.
Tsedaqah, according to Birch12, is also translated as righteousness. Here the 
focus is on right relationships. God’s righteousness refers to his concrete 
acts to establish and preserve relationship. His law is a gift that aims at 
establishing terms under which relationship is preserved and maintained13. 
Both the Old and New Testaments teach that sacrifice was required to 
achieve this rightness in relations. Justice therefore stands in relationship 
to justification. Justification means that we are declared righteous by God 
because of the ultimate sacrifice of Christ. This imputed righteousness, 
11 B. C. Birch, Let justice roll down. The Old Testament, ethics, and Christian life (Kentucky: 
John Knox Press, 1991), pp. 155–156.
12 Ibid., pp. 153–154.
13 Tsedaqah can also be translated as vindication, deliverance, uprightness, right and even 
prosperity.
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i.e. righteousness that we possess because of our connectedness in faith 
to Christ, makes us people who practice justice. Those who are made 
righteous through a sacrifice also practice sacrificial justice. They know 
that relationships will not be right and prosperous and joyful without 
sacrifice.
A crucial dimension of justice is equality. Duncan Forrester14 argues 
that equality refers to equality in worth, dignity and value. Inequality is 
witnessed to in evils like racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, etc. Forrester, 
however, concedes that there is disagreement on how this equality of worth 
can be translated into policy and practice.
4. Equality
Oliver O’Donovan argues against an absolutistic equalization process. 
O’Donovan is in favour of the notion of the equal worth of humans. He, 
however, reckons that this theological and metaphysical notion, which 
constitutes the foundations of society, should not be confused with the 
superstructure of human existence. Where revolutionary equalization 
causes this confusion, social structures are dissolved and degraded, and 
human life becomes unliveable. The metaphysical foundational principle of 
equal worth cannot be implemented in society without taking the complex 
differentiated nature of the structures of society into consideration. For 
him differentiation is the law of every social organism. Attributive justice, 
as justice of differentiation, is influenced by notions like affinity and 
bonds of loyalty, the promotion of talent, wise appointments to office, the 
provision of opportunities to those who could use them. “We depend on 
the justice of differentiation from the moment we take our first breath and 
are placed in the arms of our mother, rather than being handed to whoever 
may be next in the queue for a child.”15 O’Donovan does, however, caution 
that this emphasis on justice of differentiation should not close our eyes for 
those kinds of difference which are simply unjust.
14 D. Forrester, On human worth (London: SCM Press, 2001), p. 30.
15 Ibid., pp. 42.
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O’Donovan16 suggests that we view persons as always equal in worth, 
but that we differentiate in roles and classes. Roles that we play are 
distinguished from each other and are not equal in an absolutistic sense. 
In the same way classes, communities and collectives e.g. genders do have 
differences. Allocations to men’s’ health care and women’s’ heath care, to 
boys’ education and to girls’ education should not be done on a 50–50 basis, 
but in terms of what each requires in specific contexts and instances. He 
employs Paul’s words in Galatians 3:28 to argue against the absolute or 
revolutionary equalization of classes.
Despite his plea for equality in the context of the justice of allocation 
and differentiation he identifies three thresholds where the metaphysical 
equality of worth should also be adhered to in practices and policies. There 
should be strict equality in cases where we fight against death for the saving 
of life.17 There should be strict equality with regard to the opportunity to 
live and to participate in society, since these constitute part of the heart of 
worth and dignity.18 The third threshold for strict equality is the equality 
before the law, where prosopolempsia, i.e. prejudice against the person, 
should not determine the process. 19
In a very illuminating article, Bram van de Beek20 showed a few years ago 
how Calvin’s perspectives on equality can enrich contemporary discussions 
on justice and equality in our pluralistic public domains. Van de Beek 
argues that equality cannot be understood as absolute equality. Equality 
should rather be understood in terms of the notion of aequitas that Calvin 
employs. Aequitas refers to the quest for equilibrium, for balance (‘ewewig’) 
in society. It implies that we need equity (from aequitas) measures to build 
a society of greater equilibrium; a society of balance, of moderation, where 
some do not have too much and others too little. A society of equilibrium 
is enhanced where we practice an ethos of self-denial, sacrifice, service and 
16 Ibid., pp. 43–44, 50–51.
17 Ibid., p. 44.
18 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
19 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
20 A van de Beek, “Beyond the unfounded optimism of equity”, in E van der Borght (ed.), 
Affirming and living with differences (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2003), pp. 147–160.
157Katts  •  STJ 2017, Vol 3, No 2, 145–162
care, and where we do not only bear the burden of the other, but where we 
bear the other one as burden.
Justice and equality is due to all people and creatures, because we have 
God-given, and therefore, inalienable, dignity, worth and value. South 
African theologians like Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, John De Gruchy, 
Charles Villa-Vicencio, Denise Ackerman, Dirk Smit, Nico Koopman and 
many others share these understandings of dignity, justice and equality 
and used them to propagate the fall of Apartheid and, as we journey to a 
society of dignity, they still argue for reconciliation, justice, quality and 
freedom.
Furthermore, we can say that justice is only present where freedom prevails.
5. Freedom
‘Christianus homo omnium dominus est liberrimus, nulli subiectus. 
Christianus homo omnium servus est officiosissimus, omnibus subiectus.’21 
– ‘A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a 
perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.’
According to reverend Travis J. Loeslie (pastor of St. Peter Lutheran Church 
in Lester Prairie, MN), Luthers paradoxical teaching of Christian freedom, 
following Christ and St. Paul, joins lord and servant in one person. By 
faith alone, God sets a man utterly, completely, free in Christ. He is lord 
of all, subject to none. Love binds him as an utterly dutiful servant to the 
neighbour, subject to everyone. The paradox of Christian freedom then 
plays out in faith and love.
The ‘freedom’ Luther has in mind is deeply relational. As he makes clear in 
‘The Freedom of a Christian,’ it is found in a relationship with Christ, who 
has liberated the self from a horizon limited by the forces of ‘sin, death, and 
the devil’.
Furthermore, as Luther makes clear, for the one on whom this freedom is 
conferred, the world now becomes an arena for service and good works. 
The bondage formerly known in relation to ‘sin, death, and the devil’ 
21 See more at: http://lutheranreformation.org/theology/on-the-freedom-of-a-christian/#_ftn1
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is transferred now to the needs of the neighbour and the world, but the 
motivation is completely transformed. The very love that has enabled 
freedom now flows forth in service.22 It is not timid or sentimental; the shape 
of this love itself is cruciform. Consequently, those held by this love should 
not be surprised to find themselves in the midst of a remarkable adventure 
that reflects both the suffering and joy of Christ’s death and resurrection. 
As Luther says in ‘The Freedom of a Christian’: “From faith there flows a 
love and joy in the Lord. From love there proceeds a joyful, willing, and 
free mind that serves the neighbour and takes no account of gratitude or 
ingratitude, praise or blame, gain or loss. We do not serve others with an 
eye toward making them obligated to us. Nor do we distinguish between 
friends and enemies or anticipate their thankfulness or ingratitude. Rather 
we freely and willingly spend ourselves and all that we have” (Lutheran 
Reformation: [Online]).
Serene Jones23 identifies five forms of oppression that we need to be freed 
from, namely freedom from exploitation, freedom from marginalisation, 
freedom from powerlessness, freedom from cultural imperialism, and 
freedom from violence.
6. Reception of Calvin’s and Luther’s theological and ethical 
thought by South African theologians
From Luther’s teaching on Christian freedom, as stated in his famous 
quotation at the beginning of this section, one can detect that Luther also 
calls one to freedom, to just practises, equal treatment and respect for 
others. His understanding of freedom is one that invites one to freedom 
of service, free to share and care. As the South African theologian, Denise 
Ackerman noted; ‘Was theirs (Reformers) not a journey of ‘freedom from’ 
to ‘freedom for 24’.
22 A classic study in Luther’s ethics is George Forell’s Faith Active in Love (New York: 
American, 1954).
23 S. Jones, Feminist theory and Christian theology. Cartographies of grace (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Fortress Press, 2000), pp. 79–93.
24 D. Ackerman, Surprised by the man on the borrowed donkey. Ordinary blessings (Cape 
Town: Lux Verbi, 2014), pp. 155.
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6.1 On freedom
It is this kind understanding of freedom that inspired South African 
theologians to call on all its citizens to become involved in public strategies 
to fight the oppressive, racist and dividing Apartheid policies, and to work 
for a democratic, free, inclusive, non-racial, just and equal society where 
dignity reigns.
Ackerman helped us by, firstly, picturing this ‘freedom for’ as abundance; 
meaning that we discover a sense of fullness, wholeness, and the desire 
to share our bounty (Ackerman 2014:165). Secondly, she thinks of hope. 
Being ‘free for’ is to live with hope, because we know hope ourselves. As she 
quotes Heb.11:1, she goes on to argue that “Freedom in faith rests solidly 
on the belief that God has given us our freedom, that we have to accept 
and enjoy it, and that we dare to hope and trust that we can move beyond 
all that limits our freedom into a space that is filled with a lightness of 
being which we call ’freedom’. Then we can become communities of hope” 
(Ackerman 2014:166). Thirdly she thinks “‘freedom for’ is to be free to love 
my neighbour as myself … which is expressed by sharing with and caring 
for one another” (Ackerman, 2014:166). It is this understanding of freedom 
that helped South Africa on its journey to dignity.
6.2 On equality, dignity and justice
On the question of equal dignity and justice, Tutu25 reminds us that “there 
is another kind of justice: restorative justice, whose chief purpose is not 
punitive but restorative, healing. It holds as central the essential humanity 
of the perpetrator of even the most gruesome atrocity, never giving up on 
anyone, believing in the essential goodness of all as created in the image of 
God, and believing that even the worst of us still remains a child of God with 
the potential to become better, someone to be salvaged, to be rehabilitated, 
not to be ostracised but ultimately to be reintegrated into community” 
(Tutu. 2011:42). He further said that “I could not have fought against the 
discrimination of apartheid and not also fight against the discrimination 
that homosexuals endure, even in our churches and faith groups … 
Opposing apartheid was a matter of justice. Opposing discrimination 
against women is a matter of justice. Opposing discrimination on the basis 
25 Tutu, D. 2011. God is not a Christian. Speaking truth in times of crisis. (London, Rider).
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of sexual orientation is a matter of justice.” “We are all equal, of equal 
worth in the sight of our Father. All, all belong: gay, lesbian, so-called 
straight.” (Tutu. 2011:54–56). De Gruchy holds the view that “’restorative 
justice’ is not, however, a weak form of justice, a dilution of the normal 
legal process. Nor does it necessarily exclude other forms of justice, even 
retribution or the use of punishment as a deterrent.” Restorative justice is 
rather the attempt to “recover certain neglected dimensions that make for a 
more complete understanding of justice.” Its emphasis is on rehabilitation, 
on compensation, on the recovery of dignity and the healing of social 
wounds. This he continues, “is precisely what is at the heart of justice in 
the biblical tradition; it is relational and social, it requires both embrace 
and the overcoming of oppression in all its forms.” (De Gruchy 2002:203).
Pillay also argues for the equality of men and women when she adds her 
voice “to those who believe that it is not important to find the maleness or 
femaleness of God so that we (Christians, who are either female or male, 
can align ourselves with God and thereby affirm our superior nature, but 
that we find our common humanity, our equal human dignity, in God 
incarnate through the birth, life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus 
of Nazareth.’26
7. Conclusion
This paper argued that the theological insights of Calvin (justice and 
equality) and Luther (freedom) enrich our contemporary public theological 
discussions and our broader interdisciplinary public discourses about 
themes like dignity, justice, freedom and equality. From their theological 
and ethical insight South African theologians in particular have developed 
their reformed theology and offered a richer way of describing the notions 
like dignity, justice, equality and freedom, which all enhance and help to 
guide our journey to a society of dignity, equality and responsible freedom. 
Thus we celebrate Reformation as transformation to dignity. Reformed 
theology also assisted us in identifying and mobilising the resources in 
26 M. Pillay, “Rereading New Testament text: A public-theological resource for addressing 
gender inequality in the context of HIV/Aids in South Africa”, in L. Hansen (ed) 2007, 
Christian in Public: Aims, Methodologies and issues in public theology (Stellenbosch: 
African Sun Media, 2007), 212–213.
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faith communities, civil society and also in political and economic life 
to actively transform our once Apartheid South Africa to a democratic, 
inclusive, equal, free and just South Africa. We are not fully there yet, but 
as we journey together, we shall continue to work together on lighting the 
path on how to get there.
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